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Fifty years ago, when Franklin Roosevelt elevated William 0. 
Douglas to the Supreme Court, the Court was rapidly dismantling 
the constitutional protection of all economic rights. The battle over 
Lochner was coming to an end because the one thing that united all 
New Deal Justices was the belief that legislatures had to be free to 
seek a better and fairer economic environment. Douglas fully con-
curred; indeed, the majority of the major cases withdrawing judicial 
scrutiny from economic transactions bear his name. 1 
The end of one jurisprudential battle typically marks the begin-
ning of the next. With New Dealers firmly in control of the judicial 
power, the Justices split over how to use it. Just as modern politi-
cians have tried to apply the lessons of Vietnam, the New Deal Jus-
tices were determined to apply the lessons of Lochner. But, again as 
with Vietnam, different people drew different lessons. One faction, 
rallying behind Felix Frankfurter, found the lesson to be the evils of 
judicial activism. The lesson translated into a jurisprudence empha-
sizing procedural regularity on one hand and deference to legisla-
tive action on the other. For another faction, the lesson of Lochner 
was the error of protecting economic rights. This simple lesson had 
an equally simple solution: cease protecting the wrong rights. 
Thereafter the Court could protect its own special constituency 
groups-blacks, labor, urbanites-as it thought fit.z 
During the 1950s and early 1960s a new jurisprudence emerged 
at Harvard largely tracking the Frankfurter position. Although ul-
timately unsuccessful in holding back the Warren Court, the 
* Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor of Law. University of Texas. I would like to 
thank my colleagues Jack Getman, Doug Laycock. and Sandy Levinson for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article. 
I. 313 U.S. 236 (1941); 336 U.S. 106 (1949); 342 U.S. 421 (1952); 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
2. Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger in THE NEW AMERICAr-; 
PO!.ITICAL SYSTEM 179, 188-94 (A. King ed. 1978); Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court. 
the Commentators and the Search for Values in THE BL:RGER COLRT 218, 218-20 (V. Blasi 
ed. 1983); Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275 (1989). 
267 
268 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:267 
Harvard jurisprudence had an important impact on legal elites and 
therefore on the legitimacy of the judicial product. 
Today, in the continuing debate about the Warren Court leg-
acy, the battle over rights has reemerged again. The Federalist So-
ciety looks to undoing the Warren Court initiatives by adopting a 
Frankfurterian-like view and freeing legislative bodies from most, if 
not all, restraints. On the left, the dominant elite strain of the Criti-
cal Legal Studies movement rejects the rights-based jurisprudence 
associated with Douglas and the Warren Court.J In between, lib-
eral scholars search from moral philosophy to civic republicanism 
to define the appropriate scope of constitutional rights. 4 
By longevity and behavior, Douglas's career uniquely spans 
these battles. He progressed from a mainstream New Deal liberal 
to anti-establishment hero, and in the process he spoke to each of 
the rights' debates. Although his opinions in Skinner, Griswold, 
and Roe v. Wade assist significantly those who would create consti-
tutional rights on the basis of moral philosophy, it is the first 
amendment where Douglas contributed most to the idea of judicial 
protection of rights. Writing in the New York Times on Douglas's 
retirement, Anthony Lewis aptly observed: "Freedom of thought 
and expression was his best known theme as a judge. "s It is also a 
theme that, set in the context of the debate over rights, illustrates 
Douglas's significance as a Justice. 
I 
Years ago, on the occasion of his thirty-fifth anniversary of ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court, I wrote an article entitled Evolu-
tion to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment 6 in an 
attempt to correct the then-prevailing view (promoted by Douglas 
himself) that Douglas had always been at the frontiers of first 
amendment protection. Douglas joined the Court as a mainstream 
New Deal liberal quite content to work within Holmes's clear and 
present danger test. But with the beginning of McCarthyism, 
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Douglas began a progression that eventually led to his mislabeled 
liberal absolutism. 
Because such progressions do not "just" happen, my other goal 
was to identify the causes of his leftward evolution. I suggested that 
one was the passing from the scene of his patron FDR; another was 
his summer travels in the third world; and a final one was experi-
ence simpliciter which by the mid-1950s caused him to believe that 
restrictions on speech were invariably motivated by fear, or worse, 
and were virtually per se unconstitutional. I omitted one other fac-
tor: Understandably, if not entirely commendably, I pulled my 
punches and failed to attribute part of the evolution to the waning 
of Douglas's presidential ambitions. Without that shift, Douglas's 
place in the history of the Court would be more open to doubt. 
On the same occasion, Thomas Emerson concluded that Doug-
las made a major theoretical contribution-indeed a "totally new 
dimension" 7-to freedom of expression with his emphasis on indi-
vidual fulfillment as one of the cornerstone values protected. In like 
vein Vincent Blasi was able to find the single best example of his 
checking value theory in a Douglas opinion.s Nevertheless, it was 
for others-the Emersons, the Blasis, the Meiklejohns-to piece to-
gether the theoretical structures of the first amendment. Douglas's 
opinions would naturally be helpful, but as William Cohen so accu-
rately notes, Douglas was a pragmatist; he left theory building to 
others.9 
Stated bluntly, Douglas's doctrinal contributions are not im-
pressive. Nor is it a matter of passage of time, the normal fading of 
an ex-Justice. Douglas's many critics, both while he was sitting and 
afterwards, were right. His opinions were not models; they appear 
to be hastily written; and they are easy to ignore. For those of us 
who think Douglas was correct in his results and instincts, this is 
too bad. 
The reasons for his doctrinal insignificance are not news to 
anyone: one was legal realism and the other, by no means unre-
lated, was his contempt for what he saw as the legal establish-
ment-the Harvard Law School and its law review alumni 
association functioning as the American Law Institute. So long as 
he perceived that the criticisms of his opinions came from a con-
servative legal establishment, he did not care. His pejorative refer-
7. Emerson, Justice Douglas' Comribution to the Law: The First Amendment, 74 
CoLUM. L REv. 353. 356 (1974). 
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ence to doctrinal argument in Supreme Court opinions as "Harvard 
fly paper" expresses the contempt he felt for his critics.1o 
Douglas drank at the well of legal realism too long and too 
thoroughly. With the other founders of the movement he stripped 
away the silly doctrinal shrouds that marked legal activities. In the 
process he concluded that doctrine was irrelevant, the explanatory 
cloak for decisions reached on more significant grounds. Whether 
the subject was business law (his academic specialty at Yale) or the 
rapid dismantling of the constitutional superstructure of the Loch-
ner Era, Douglas did not-indeed he could not-take doctrine 
seriously. 
Perhaps he was right not to take doctrine seriously, but as G. 
Edward White notes, this may have been an insight too fundamen-
tal and vastly too unsettling for others to accept. 11 Thus he failed to 
appreciate that others, including those not wedded to the judicial 
conservatism of Harvard, did take doctrine seriously.12 With his 
acknowledged abilities he could have played the doctrinal game su-
perbly, but he saw doctrine as a waste of time and he had non-legal 
activities that were more pressing than authoring rationalizations 
for those silly enough to believe them. 
Douglas, the legal realist, turns out not to have been much of a 
judicial realist. He had to know that almost everyone else believed 
doctrine to have a part in the legal system. By wholly eschewing 
doctrine, he not only suffered a loss of professional esteem, he suf-
fered a loss of influence. It is not easy to explain why a man of such 
remarkable abilities would voluntarily do this, and nothing he has 
said offers help. 
My own view is that he was the quintessential executive. He 
believed in and exemplified efficiency; he knew how to make deci-
sions, even tough ones. As Chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission he once remarked: "It's goddamn lonely in the 
front-line trenches these days." u One of his most hostile critics, 
former Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold, recognized Douglas as a 
"great and active [New Deal] administrator." 14 The problem was, 
as White notes, that the executive strengths that propelled his mete-
10. /d. at 580. 
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74 VA. L. REV. 17, 84 (1988). 
12. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-
Law-Due-Process Formula", 16 UCLA L. REV. 716, 749 (1969): "As one who has previously 
expressed mild dismay at the way Justice Douglas writes his opinions, let me say that I 
understand better now. Having said that I confess that I still yearn for a little more explana-
tion ... you can take the boy out of Harvard Law School. but .... " 
13. Rodell, Bill Douglas, American, 61 AM. MERCCRY 656, 665 (1945). 
14. Griswold, Foreword to B. WOLFMAN, DISSENT WITHOliT 0PI1'10N xii (1975). 
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oric rise, were not judicial strengths, with a single exception, to be 
discussed at length in the next section: the willingness to stand up 
and be counted when doing so had obvious costs and seemingly few 
benefits. 
Douglas was a man of action, not reflection. He wrote his dis-
sents before the author of the majority had put pen to paper; he 
chafed while waiting for the Chief Justices to assign majorities; he 
began writing his own instantly-! mean that literally not figura-
tively-on receipt of an assignment.'s In a large, unfortunate sense, 
Douglas was miscast in the judiciary. Although elevation to the 
Supreme Court seems the appropriate reward for a president to be-
stow on an outstanding lawyer, in Douglas's case higher executive 
office would have better suited his abilities. He was temperamen-
tally incapable of functioning within the contemplative world of the 
mid-twentieth century judiciary. 
If legal realism was Douglas's undoing when it came to doc-
trine, it turned out to be his strength in casting his vote. The sine 
qua non of legal realism was the belief that doctrine obscured more 
than it explained about why a court decided as it did. Thereafter, 
legal realists split into a variety of approaches to the law. 
Douglas was a functionalist. While at Yale he remade the 
teaching of corporate law by focusing on how corporations be-
haved. He believed, in what now seems an obvious point, that if 
you did not understand what corporations were doing and why they 
were doing it, you had no chance of successfully regulating their 
behavior. He studied political, economic, and social institutions in 
which law and business intersected to better understand contempo-
rary problems. As part of his study he turned to the fledgling em-
pirical social sciences for whatever assistance they would yield. The 
same held true when he went to the New Deal and from there to the 
Court. 
Any Justice who successfully searches out the underlying facts 
of litigation will be rewarded. But as important as facts are gener-
ally, nowhere are they as crucial as in the first amendment area. 
Difficult cases often turn on determinations of dangerousness, and 
any mistake made by miscalculating or overemphasizing the danger 
turns what should be constitutionally protected activity into crimi-
nal conduct. Furthermore, as Douglas recognized, speech is often 
fragile; self-censorship comes too easily. A mistaken conviction of a 
dissenter may not only silence him but many others as well, who 
now have reason to fear similar police action against themselves. 
15. Powe, Mr. Jusrice Douglas. 55 WASH. L. REV. 285, 286 (1980). 
272 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:267 
Douglas saw no inherent limits on where he could look for 
facts. First came the record-what happened and why. But this 
would hardly set him apart from either a Brennan or a Harlan. 
Vastly more important in the first amendment was Douglas's sensi-
tive antennae for the preconditions for freedom of speech. Emerson 
aptly singled out Douglas's "remarkable ability to grasp the realities 
of the system of freedom of expression ... understand[ing) the ap-
paratus of repression."t6 
Consider Douglas's separate opinion in Keith. At issue was the 
constitutionality of the Nixon Administration's domestic national 
security wiretapping. While the Court agreed with Douglas, he 
went far beyond his brethren in describing the domestic climate: 
[W]e are currently in the throes of another national seizure of paranoia, resem-
bling the hysteria which surrounded the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Palmer Raids, 
and the McCarthy era. Those who register dissent or who petition their govern-
ments for redress are subjected to scrutiny by grand juries, by the FBI, and even by 
the military. Their associates are interrogated. Their homes are bugged and their 
telephones are wiretapped. They are befriended by secret government informers. 
Their patriotism and loyalty are questioned.17 
What is striking, even at this distance, is that this wholly unjudicial 
and seemingly injudicious blast is so accurate in describing the 
Nixon administration. Yet Douglas's opinion was delivered a 
month before the Watergate break-in and therefore before any pub-
lic revelation of Nixon's encroachment on civil liberties. Douglas's 
Keith opinion demonstrated his comprehension of what was really 
happening in America. 
II 
Keith, of course, harkens back to Dennis and the McCarthy 
Era when Douglas made his major jurisprudential contribution: 
demonstrating for all to see-and many to condemn-that a Justice 
could defend civil liberties during crisis times. Such action had 
neither a long nor distinguished lineage. It last had been seriously 
attempted by a discredited Roger Taney acting as a visible fifth col-
umn on behalf of the Southern cause during the Civil War. 
Furthermore, as I will soon discuss, the prevailing legal theory 
was that it could not and should not be done; judges should inter-
vene only when government actions were manifestly unreasonable. 
The Japanese exclusion cases ts (the principal case written by Black, 
16. Emerson, supra note 7, at 354. 
17. 407 U.S. 297, 329-31 (1972). 
18. Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214 (1944): Hirayabashi v. United States, 320 
u.s. 81 (1943). 
1989] JUSTICE DOUGLAS 273 
joined by Douglas) demonstrate how circumscribed a class "unrea-
sonable" can be, especially in times of great national stress. By go-
ing against the grain during the McCarthy Era, Douglas (and for 
this part of the article everything said about Douglas applies virtu-
ally equally to Black) suffered a professional loss of reputation, but 
also helped discredit the prevailing ideology, although realistically 
in the first amendment area the ideology self-destructed in a series 
of cases beginning in 1959. 
Dennis, charging the Communist Party leadership as a sedi-
tious conspiracy, is the key case of the McCarthy Era. If hysteria 
were ever justified by unanticipated events, it was justified by the 
events between the Dennis indictment in July, 1948, through trial 
and conviction, which took almost all of 1949, to the two appellate 
affirmances in 1950 and 1951: the Berlin blockade (1948); Chiang 
Kai-shek fleeing from Mainland China ( 1949); the first Soviet atom 
bomb (1949); Klaus Fuchs' confession (1950); Chinese intervention 
as MacArthur approached the Yalu (1950); and the indictment 
(1950) and conviction of the Rosen bergs (1951 ). Frankfurter put 
the case into this perspective in his concurring opinion when reflect-
ing on the appropriate judicial function: "History teaches that the 
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become 
embroiled in the passions of the day .... "1 9 One way or another all 
but Black and Douglas agreed with Frankfurter that the Smith Act 
could be validly applied to the leaders of the Communist Party in 
the circumstances of post-War America. 
Douglas summarized the majority vote acidly. "Only those 
held by fear and panic could think" that the Communist Party was 
an internal menace.zo As he and Black would be called upon to 
note with unfortunate regularity, the methods of a communist state 
were used to fight internal communism. Thus Douglas quoted 
Vishinsky's The Law of the Soviet State for the proposition that 
there could be no freedom of speech for foes to socialism and added 
that "[o]ur concern should be that we accept no such standard for 
the United States. "z 1 
With Dennis the decapitation of the Communist Party leader-
ship was complete, as was the constitutional validation of the gov-
ernment program. Unions were purged with the assistance of 
§ 9(h) of Taft-Hartley,n and government employees fell victim to 
the Federal Loyalty-Security Program (sustained in Bailey v. Rich-
19. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951 ). 
20. !d. at 589. 
21. /d. at 591. 
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ardson)23 which relied heavily on the Attorney General's List basi-
cally sustained a few weeks prior to Dennis in Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath.24 The issues that remained to be 
decided were: ( 1) did the first amendment place any limits on the 
new type of legislative investigation that HUAC was pioneering; 
(2) was it relevant that a person joined the Communist Party for 
political rather than revolutionary reasons; and (3) would the paral-
lel state loyalty-security program receive a like imprimatur to that 
of Bailey v. Richardson? The first of these questions would wait 
until the end of the decade and the settling of the constitutionality 
of Southern segregation. The latter two were ready for resolution 
almost immediately, the membership problem being presented in 
the context of exiling long-term resident aliens. 
In 1939 the Court had held on statutory grounds that an alien 
who had resigned from the Communist Party could not be deported 
based on past discontinued membership simpliciter.2s Congress re-
sponded with the Alien Registration Act of 1940 by making it clear 
that membership in an organization committed to the overthrow of 
the government was sufficient ground for deportation. The Act was 
unmistakably retroactive: membership may have been legal; it may 
have been innocent; it may even have been terminated prior to the 
Act; none of that was relevant. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy26 the 
Court sustained the Act on facts showing (in at least one case) that 
membership was innocent, triggered by a specific injustice the Party 
was protesting at the time. 
When Congress passed the infamous McCarran Act in 1950, 
one provision relieved the Government of even the necessity of 
proving the Communist Party believed in the overthrow of the gov-
ernment; the Act made past membership in the Party grounds for 
deportation. Intentionally or not, the Act reached membership 
during World War II when the Party actively supported 
Roosevelt's wartime policies and was urging cooperation. In Gal-
van v. Press 27 the Court sustained deportation of an alien who, hav-
ing lived and worked (and married) in the United States for thirty 
years, had the misfortune of joining the Party during the War, even 
though he ceased membership in 1946, some four years before the 
McCarran Act was passed. Douglas and Black were able to use the 
retroactive harshness of the statutes as well as the appalling facts to 
dissent effectively, even in the face of a long-standing rule of com-
23. 341 U.S. 918 (1951). 
24. 341 U.S. 123 (1950). 
25. Kessler'· Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939). 
26. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
27. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
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plete congressional power. The majority's sole response to the 
hardship and injustice was to note that others had suffered hard-
ships; after all, the Japanese exclusion cases showed we could treat 
citizens badly too.zs And the fact is that Douglas and Black dis-
sented alone; aliens remained an easy target for majoritarian wrath 
and xenophobia. 
Two cases sustaining facets of New York's loyalty-security 
program showed nuanced distinctions were not of great interest to 
the majority of the Court. Adler29 brought to the Court the Fein-
berg Law with its prima facie presumption that membership in a 
listed organization was grounds for taking a teacher out of a class-
room. Resting on the right-privilege distinction-it is after all a 
privilege not a right, to teach our young-and embracing guilt by 
association as no other case ever did, Adler sustained the law in its 
preenforcement stage. Frankfurter, in dissent, wished to wait and 
see how listing and then allowing a teacher to explain membership 
would operate in practice. The other eight knew, although only 
Douglas and Black thought that important first amendment 
rights-not to mention careers-would be sacrificed. 
More than a hint of how the Feinberg Law would operate 
came when New York stripped Dr. Edward Barsky of his right to 
practice medicine for six months because he had been convicted of 
failing to turn over to the HUAC the subpoenaed papers of the 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, an organization he had 
joined after he returned from treating the Loyalists wounded during 
the Spanish Civil War. Everyone agreed Barsky was fully compe-
tent to practice medicine. But of course that was not the point: 
fully competent Communists and fellow travellers were being de-
nied employment across the nation; that was the whole point of the 
loyalty-security programs. Douglas closed with another plea: 
"When a doctor cannot save lives in America because he is opposed 
to Franco in Spain, it is time to call a halt and look critically at the 
neurosis that has possessed us." Jo 
And in fact, largely on technical, nonconstitutional grounds 
the Court began to do so for several years beginning in 1955, 
thereby alleviating in individual cases the hardships inflicted. Not 
until the end of the decade would the major constitutional issues 
return. But before looking at how later cases affected perceptions of 
the judicial role, it is necessary to discuss the legal ideology that 
came to the fore in the 1950s. 
28. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591. 
29. 342 u.s. 485 (1952). 
30. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 474 (1954). 
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III 
The creative energy of the realist movement made Yale the 
dominant intellectual force in American law. But faculty losses to 
government service and private practice and the desire for a Rule of 
Law-not to mention the more immediate problem of distinguish-
ing the American judicial system from European totalitarianism-
placed such strains on realism that the intellectual mantle of Ameri-
can law returned to Harvard. Just as Yale had been the place to be 
in the 1930s, Harvard became the place in the 1950s.JI There, a 
generation of scholars firmly committed to the legitimacy of both 
the New Deal and the Rule of Law struggled to create a new juris-
prudence recognizing realist insights but nevertheless striving to 
cabin judicial discretion in ways consistent with democratic 
governance. 
The new process jurisprudenceJL-as announced in a series of 
articles throughout the decade in the Harvard Law Review, as well 
as two seminal casebooks coauthored by Henry Hart, had an in-
triguing process formulation.JJ First and foremost it stressed the 
reasoning process used by judges to reach and explain results. By 
1959, separate articles by Hart and one of his co-authors, Herbert 
Weschler, had sharpened this demand. They saw the Supreme 
Court as engaged in a collective reasoning process, achieving the 
correct result by a mature judgment that would then be explained in 
an opinion written so that all readers could see that the relevant 
considerations had been vented fully.J4 Because judges were neces-
sarily not the predominant lawgivers when significant, rather than 
interstitial, choices were to be made, it was essential that they give 
due deference to what had gone before. Respect for doctrine be-
came primary. 
Beyond, but a necessary part of, its doctrinal emphasis, the 
new jurisprudence would further limit discretion by institutional al-
location. That is, on issues where other institutions have superior 
knowledge or fact-finding abilities, judges should defer. The judici-
3 I. So much so, that much to Douglas's dismay Yale appeared to play catch up by 
appointing a Harvard graduate as dean and hiring Harvard-trained Frankfurter clerks for the 
faculty. J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WH.LIAM 0. DOUGLAS 337-38 
(1980). 
32. I have taken the term from G.E. WHITE, THE AMERICA1' JUDICIAL TRADITION: 
PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (1976); White, From Rea/ism to Critical Legal 
Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819, 827 (1986). 
33. H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(1953); H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). 
34. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959). 
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ary did not have to "roll over and die," but simply recognize as 
Stone had said in 1936 that judges are not the only actors who have 
the capacity to govern. Much of the judicial function would be pro-
cess oriented: insuring that institutions maintain procedural regu-
larity and choosing the institution best suited for deciding the 
question at hand. The central allocational fact in constitutional ad-
judication was that the judiciary was the inappropriate institution 
when the issues were political, that is, when the outcome "depended 
on a choice to interpret the social world in one way rather than 
another."Js Thus a deference to the outcomes of the democratic 
process was an inherent facet of the new jurisprudence. 
Because the new jurisprudence was the creation of New Deal-
ers, there was no necessary reason why Black and Douglas should 
have fallen outside its pale. But its demands pushed in directions 
Black and Douglas could not go even if they had wished. A de-
mand for deference to various decision-makers, be they the presi-
dent, Congress, state legislators, HUAC, or the Board of Regents in 
New York, could not be squared with what Black and Douglas felt 
was their duty to defer to the Constitution. Recognizing the supe-
rior competence of HUAC to ascertain the needs to invade political 
associations did not seem to them to be particularly apt. 
Surprisingly, the Harvard scholarship of the 1950s did not 
touch the communist cases. 36 For example, consider the monumen-
tal attempt of Hart and Sacks "to describe American law compre-
hensively, including all of its major institutional settings and 
accounting for the various permutations of interrelationships be-
tween institutions. "37 Their casebook about public law and private 
ordering avoided issues of constitutional law. Its table of contents 
reflects areas where constitutional law might intrude, but these are 
undeveloped. Thus its table of contents has a section on legislative 
investigations. But when the reader gets to that section in the tenta-
35. Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s. 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 594-605 (!988). 
36. An important exception was Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold's timely publication of 
three speeches defending the right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination before 
legislative committees. E. GRISWOLD. THE FIF-TH AMENDMENT TODAY (!955). The 
speeches had two principal points: ( l) that an innocent person could feel the need to claim 
the fifth; and (2) that the legislature had the responsibility to more actively supervise and 
regularize the investigating committee behavior, especially when a sub-committee consisted 
of a single member sitting. The volume called for no judicial changes in settled law and 
reflected strongly the process empha,is of the new jurisprudence. Interestingly, Griswold 
recognized that t·he fifth was often being taken because of the first. id. at 60-6!. but did not trv 
to discuss the issue in first amendment terms. an important, and correct. tactical choice give~ 
the currency then of the pejorative "Fifth Amendment Communists." When it did come 
time to consider the first, however, Griswold was nowhere near so solicitous. See Griswold, 
Absolutes in the Dark. 8 UTAH L. REv. 167 (1963). and text at notes 49-53. 
37. Peller, supra note 35, at 591-92. 
278 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:267 
tive edition, the authors note it "will not be developed in this 
edition." 3s 
The scholarly focus, and not only that of Hart and Sacks, was 
on other areas where Black and Douglas were not as far apart from 
their brethren. But that did not help the reputations of either 
Douglas or Black for several reasons.39 One was Frankfurter, who 
helped create process jurisprudence and in turn for whom process 
jurisprudence was made. He had been a friend and colleague and 
teacher of some of its creators; others had served apprenticeships as 
his law clerks. His energy and magnetic personality made him the 
role model that all should follow.40 At Harvard Law School he was 
perceived as precisely what a judge should be: intelligent, un-
dogmatic, disinterested, but passionate. He excelled in those areas 
where judicial creativity was called for, but understood fully the 
necessity of deference to democratic institutions when value-laden 
decisions were at issue. A belief flourished that Frankfurter-"Our 
Felix" as he was known at Harvard Law School-was a shining 
light of Western jurisprudence. It did not take a Harvard education 
to see that he was voting differently in the first amendment McCar-
thy Era cases than Black and Douglas.4I 
Process jurisprudence spread less through scholarship-no one 
could accuse the Harvard constitutional law faculty of that era of 
being prolific-than by word of mouth. Process jurisprudence also 
took time, at least fifteen years, to mature. Thus not everyone at 
Harvard adhered to it and the accretion of its tenets was uneven. 
But a basic rallying point was that Black and especially Douglas 
were not of the caliber to be taken seriously as judges. One law 
professor who was a Harvard Law School 1950s LL.B. and an early 
1960s teaching fellow, described an overwhelming ambience of real 
hostility to Douglas and Black; conversely, a president of the 
38. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 33, at 1037. 
39. Obviously I was not at Harvard during the period under discussion. In putting this 
together I have relied on what was written and an oral tradition. As to the latter, as a former 
Douglas clerk, during my early years in teaching, I was regaled by stories of the way Harvard 
professors would take pot shots at Douglas. I could remember the attitude, if not the story or 
the story teller. In writing this I have talked to a number of law professors who were at 
Harvard during the period and then given each of them my draft with the express injunction 
to correct me in any ways necessary. Those I have consulted include Vern Countryman, 
Norman Dorsen, Jack Getman, George Schatzki. Ernest Smith, and Russell Weintraub. 
What appears in text is the outgrowth of this process although the final choice of language 
and emphasis was, of course, mine. See also, Dorsen. Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 367, 
385 & n.lOl (1981). 
40. "To Felix Frankfurter who first opened our minds to these problems" is the Dedica-
tion in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 33, at ix. 
41. It was well known, of course, what Frankfurter thought of Black and Douglas. See 
Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethern. 1988 Dt.:KE L.J. 71. 
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Harvard Law Review described it as a generally accepted dogma 
that Frankfurter was right on issues of constitutional law. Wher-
ever Harvard graduates taught or practiced law, Frankfurter was 
praised while Black and Douglas were treated with scorn and con-
tempt. Their votes, their analyses, were simply not the workings of 
"first-rate lawyers."42 
In his forthcoming book about American legal education, my 
colleague Jack Getman (Harvard Law School '58) writes of going to 
Harvard after City College of New York and a two-year military 
enlistment, with Douglas and Black as his legal heroes. But he soon 
discovered that they "turned out to be woefully deficient in all ... 
technical professional ways."4J Getman wryly summed it up: "One 
of the things that makes you proudest of a Harvard legal education 
is that you can explain why Douglas is wrong."44 
I have been told of one Harvard Law Review officer who was 
selected as one of Black's law clerks, an incredible honor given both 
the limited number of slots and the stark unevenness of the sitting 
Justices. Yet faculty members ridiculed him for being willing to 
waste a year of his life working for Black. (There is no comparable 
Douglas story because Douglas, to my good fortune, always went 
West for law clerks.) 
In 1963, the Harvard Law Review commissioned an article by 
Yale Professor, and former Black clerk, Charles Reich, to com-
memorate Black's twenty-fifth anniversary. The resulting article, 
Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,4s is magnificent in 
scope and substance, demonstrating Black's commitment and abil-
ity to make the eighteenth-century Constitution work in mid-twen-
tieth century America. Yet the 1963 president of the Review reports 
that there was "faculty disgruntlement (which we thought narrowly 
conceived) about both the subject and the reasoning."46 From the 
faculty perspective, what Black (and Douglas) thought and did was 
not fit for discussion in the Harvard Law Review, except perhaps as 
a subject of ridicule. 
IV 
The Court, however, was about to reenter the debate and 
would do so in a way that would profoundly change perceptions. 
42. The phrase is Hart"s. SeeP. BOBBITT, CONSTITL'TIO~AL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
Co~sTITl'TioN 53 (1982). 
43. J. GETMAN. NOTES OF A~ ACADEMIC DISSIDENT (forthcoming). 
44. Getman to author in conversation, October 4, 1988. 
45. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution. 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 ( 1963). 
46. Kester, Faculty Participation in Student Edited Law Reviews, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 14 
(1986). 
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As the 1960s were about to begin, the Supreme Court had returned 
to constitutional issues in communist cases. The major opinions 
were written by Harlan (who was perceived to be a weaker, junior 
version of Frankfurter), joined by Frankfurter since the analysis fol-
lowed his Dennis opinion, with Black and Douglas (and now War-
ren and Brennan) dissenting. These cases resulted in an academic 
debate where it became apparent, as Duncan Kennedy's student 
note would subsequently point out, that "a number of enthusiastic 
'balancers' have also been strong advocates of 'principled' decision-
making [the process jurisprudence school]."47 Once again, how-
ever, the adherents of process jurisprudence concluded that Black 
and Douglas had been bested. 
In dissent, Black and Douglas had argued that the first amend-
ment was an absolute. The majority, by contrast, viewed that claim 
as preposterous and held that balancing all the various interests at 
stake was the appropriate way of solving the issue. The academic 
community accepted the debate on the terms set by the Justices. On 
those terms Black and Douglas "had" to be wrong. It was simply 
inconceivable that "all" speech was "absolutely" protected under 
the Constitution. Numerous counter-examples were possible-and 
Harlan supplied them in a single devastating and unanswered foot-
note4s-and if Black and Douglas believed, for example, that per-
jury was the exercise of first amendment rights, then they were not 
merely wrong; their position was not worthy of discussion. 
Harvard's dean, Erwin Griswold, made the point wonderfully when 
he recalled a large illuminated sign outside a New Orleans church 
which read: "God said it. We believe it. That's all there is to it." 
The absolutism of Black and Douglas, he added, "seems a similar 
approach. " 49 
With Black and Douglas confirming the Harvard view that 
they were brain-dead, it was easy to conclude that ad hoc balancing 
"had" to be right; law is an exercise of balancing and it ought not 
come as a shock to find that that applies to the first amendment as 
much as the fourth or fifth. What was not considered was that 
Black and Douglas were using "absolutism" as a summation of how 
the balance worked out after a decade of deciding cases growing out 
of the hysteria. 
47. Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 852 n.39 
(1969). 
48. 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.IO: "That view, which of course cannot be reconciled with the 
law relating to libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicita-
tion of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like, is said to be compelled 
by the fact that the commands of the First Amendment are stated in unqualified terms." 
49. Griswold, Absolutes in the Dark, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167, 172 (1963). 
1989] JUSTICE DOUGLAS 281 
Nor would process jurisprudence allow absolutism to be used 
as a rhetorical device to express an attitude about how first amend-
ment adjudication should be approached,so because if absolutism 
was rhetorical, it would "gravely ... deprecate and damage the 
process" of decision-making which must be "as deliberate and con-
scious as men can make it."si Both possibilities, rhetorical or sub 
silentio summation of experience, were incompatible with the prem-
ises of process jurisprudence; furthermore Black and Douglas, by 
their willingness to reassess the need for action, were invading the 
legislative province. Thus they were taken literally, which, not sur-
prisingly, confirmed existing prejudices. 
Nor did process jurisprudence adherents ask whether, in oper-
ation, balancing was also a rhetorical cover. In a sense, the major-
ity opinions seemed far more absolutist than Black and Douglas. 
The majority was absolutely convinced that no matter what was 
placed in the scales to be balanced, when the government was on 
the prowl for communists, the balance was always to favor the gov-
ernment. Black and Douglas pointed that out in their dissents, and 
Black's dissents powerfully showed how a serious "balancer" would 
attempt to deal with the factors. The opinions in Barenblau,s2 Wil-
kinson,s3 Konigsberg,s4 and Anastapfoss make clear for any who 
would read that Black and Douglas were not only right in their 
criticism of the balancers' technique, but in the process were vali-
dating their positions taken in the earlier cases. These cases, com-
ing when and as they did, would make Douglas and Black heroes to 
law students as the decade progressed. 
Lloyd Barenblatt had been called before HUAC in 1954 and 
was questioned about whether he had been a Party member as a 
graduate student at Michigan after World War II. Barenblatt es-
chewed the fifth and took the first instead. Harlan's majority em-
braced the competency point of process neutrality by stating that 
the Court would not pass judgment on either the wisdom or efficacy 
of the activities of HUAC. Instead the Court announced it must 
decide the case by "balancing" the "competing private and public 
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." For the 
next seven pages the Court discussed the "public interests," i.e., 
those favoring disclosure and then, without mentioning a single pri-
50. Charles L. Black, Mr. Justice Black. the Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights, 
HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63. 
51. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 96 (1962). 
52. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
53. 365 U.S. 399 ( 1961 ). The opinion of the Court was written by Stewart. 
54. 366 u.s. 36 (I 961 ). 
55. 366 u.s. 82 (I 961 ). 
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vate interest--or ever considering that the first amendment might 
be a "public interest"-it bluntly announced in the penultimate par-
agraph: "We conclude that the balance between the individual and 
the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of 
the latter, and that therefore the provisions of the First Amendment 
have not been offended."so 
Black and Douglas demolished the majority, first by demon-
strating that balancing was inappropriate and then by showing that 
if the Court really believed balancing was valid, a proper balance 
would have resulted in reversal of Barenblatt's conviction. Had the 
balancing debate ended here, Barenblatt might have passed as a 
somewhat belated validation of HUAC, years after the issue was 
relevant. But in several 1961 cases the same majority made clear 
that when it said "balance" in the context of any mention of the 
"c" -word, it meant that the government was to win no matter what 
the facts. 
Wilkinson had been a long-time anti-HUAC activist. When 
HU AC went to Georgia in the summer of 1958, Wilkinson arrived 
a week earlier to assist those protesting the hearings. Within an 
hour of his registering at a hotel, he was served with a subpoena to 
appear. The essential distinguishing factor from Barenblatt was 
that Wilkinson was in Atlanta to protest HUAC and would not 
have been forced to appear had he been elsewhere; his "crime" was 
protesting HUAC in the late 1950s. Was this relevant? The major-
ity, adhering to its balancing, said no: "the First Amendment 
claims pressed here are indistinguishable from those considered in 
Barenblatt . ... "s7 
"Indistinguishable" would appear again in Konigsberg and 
Anastap/o, decided two months later. In both cases the majority 
held that a refusal to answer a Bar committee's question about 
membership was grounds for refusing to certify good moral charac-
ter to become a member of the Bar. In Konigsberg's case there was 
some weak evidence of past membership in the party; in Anastaplo's 
there was none. He had triggered the inquiry when, in responding 
to a request to state the principles underlying the Constitution, he 
concluded that "whenever the particular government in power be-
comes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter 
or abolish it and thereupon to establish a new government." The 
Illinois Bar was apparently worried that belief in the principles of 
the Declaration of Independence might indicate communist tenden-
cies. For the majority, the reason that the state asked about mem-
56. 360 U.S. 109. 126, 134 (1958). 
57. 365 U.S. 399, 415 (1960) (Black. J., dissenting). 
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bership was irrelevant. The state's need to know about any past 
party membership so that it could have a Bar dedicated to the high-
est principles of the law "outweighs any deterrent effect upon" first 
amendment rights.ss 
Anastaplo's facts are so appealing-his mistake was, as Black 
and Douglas accurately noted, that "he took too much of the re-
sponsibility of preserving that freedom upon himself"s9-that the 
injustice was enshrined for everyone to see. Black made it even 
clearer with possibly the most moving and powerful opinion in the 
pages of the United States Reports. The balancing test "proves piti-
fully and pathetically inadequate to cope with an invasion of indi-
vidual liberty so plainly unjustified that even the majority 
apparently feels compelled expressly to disclaim 'any view upon the 
wisdom of the State's action.' "oo 
It is not the result so much as the reasoning, process jurispru-
dence held, that matters; but maybe the result does matter, espe-
cially when it is flagrantly wrong. Deference to other institutions; 
refusal to square the premise of those being judged with constitu-
tional norms; logic and doctrine: if these components of process 
jurisprudence led to such profound injustices in 1961, seven years 
after McCarthy's fall, maybe they sustained earlier injustices. If 
Black and Douglas were right in 1961, saying the same things that 
they had always said, maybe they were right earlier. Maybe pro-
tected first amendment rights against government would not have 
brought either the nation or the judiciary to its knees.ot Maybe it 
makes sense to stand up for constitutional rights and stand against 
injustice even when democratic institutions and the legal establish-
ment argue to the contrary. 
A generation of law students coming into law schools in the 
58. 366 U.S. at 89. 
59. /d. at 114. 
60. /d. at Ill. 
61. Contrast Alexander Bickel's point that the Court should husband its resources so if 
there is a "'coup'' the Court can intervene and restore democracy. BICKEL, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 94. 178 (1970). There is something staggering about 
the judiciary intervening-an injunction perhaps0-to prevent a coup, so here is the full 
quote: 
If we should encounter. not malapportionment, not inequality and social injustice 
but a coup, an attempt by an inflamed majority or by a powerful elite, broken loose 
from other restraints, to proscribe and outlaw one or another group, or to mount a 
fundamental assault against broadly-responsive government. might not this unique 
American institution just save us" 
Reading this quote from the perspective of two decades it might be seen to justify the actions 
of Black and Douglas during the McCarthy Era because an "inflamed majority" had "broken 
loose" and functionally was "outlawing" a group. This would be more than a bit ironic since 
Bickel had nothing but contempt for Black and Douglas and revered Frankfurter. for whom 
he had clerked. 
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1960s would find those "maybes" unnecessary. When Southern 
governments attempted to wrap themselves in the cloak of the 
Court's red hunting doctrines to fight civil rights groups, it was im-
possible to argue plausibly-although Harlan for one sometimes 
tried-that neutrality required blacks to lose because reds had lost 
earlier. The civil rights litigation provided timely and powerful re-
inforcement for the positions of Black and Douglas. Moreover, 
Black's advancing age and inability to reconcile civil rights demon-
strations with first amendment rights, separated the two, to Doug-
las's overwhelming advantage. 
In a remarkable transformation in law schools (decidedly less 
so -initially-at Harvard), taking less than a decade, Black and 
Douglas went from being objects of scorn to prescient judges who 
had understood the hysteria and acted to counter it. Process juris-
prudence was not, however, an immediate casualty in this switch. 
Just as it took time to develop, so, too, its parts disintegrated over 
time. Frankfurter's mythical status was an early victim. So was the 
idea of deference; if Douglas and Black had not done enough to 
inter it, in the 1960s it became obvious that Southern governments 
would be the beneficiaries of any deference. 
Although the results sought by Black and Douglas were ac-
cepted and validated, their styles, especially Douglas's, were not. 
As White demonstrates, there are incredible institutional pressures 
for judges to eschew Douglas's realist stance and subsequent Jus-
tices have had little trouble doing so.62 Furthermore, process juris-
prudence in operation, although not intent, had turned out to be a 
conservative doctrine in the sense that its application tended to rein-
force the status quo. As the status quo became a liberal one, liberals 
could more easily embrace its tenets while conservatives would 
wonder why liberal doctrine was entitled to respect simply because 
it was there. In the years following their respective departures from 
the Court it was not necessary to embrace either Douglas's style or 
Black's jurisprudence to justify liberalism. Douglas and Black were 
right, and they showed that by being willing to stand for what was 
right; men, lawyers, yes, maybe even the Law, can do what is right. 
v 
With Frankfurter off the Court, thereby saving himself and the 
NAACP from his disgraceful fifth vote to allow Florida to save the 
NAACP from internal communism in Gibson, 6 3 a firm majority ex-
62. White, supra note II, at 77-86. 
63. B. ScHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 452-53 (1983) recounts the five-four vote against the 
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isted to implement most positions that Black and Douglas voted 
for. No longer was it an open question whether the Constitution 
would be actively enforced to protect individual liberties. At issue 
was only to what lengths the majority was willing to go. Although 
both Black and Douglas lived to see majorities holding to their 
views, Douglas again moved to dissenter and began to stake out 
positions for the next generation of liberal judges-a generation that 
never came because the era of liberal dominance of the presidency 
had ended. 
Unlike Black in his twilight, Douglas found a new constitu-
ency, the nation's youth. At a time when "never trust anyone over 
thirty" was a popular motto, Douglas achieved the status of a folk 
hero. His positions on the environment and civil liberties resonated 
with the views of youth. In Points of Rebellion he explicitly em-
braced their anti-establishment views and tweaked his contemporar-
ies by referring to the Establishment as the new George III, 
implicitly suggesting that revolutionary change would be a good 
idea. 
The battles that Douglas and Black fought in the McCarthy 
Era were formally "won": a new consensus emerged recognizing 
the importance of an independent judiciary willing to sustain polit-
ical dissent and essential personal liberties. By the Constitution's 
Bicentennial, a superbly credentialed federal judge, Robert Bork, 
who had tantalizing if unexplored jurisprudential affinities with 
both Holmes and Black, but definitely not Douglas, was denied con-
firmation to the Supreme Court in large part because he appeared to 
reject the idea of judicial enforcement of civil liberties. 
Yet even as the new consensus that Black and Douglas helped 
pioneer has achieved amazing breadth, it has splintered and been 
attacked. Within the academic community, Bork would be identi-
fied with The Federalist Society and the conservative reaction to the 
Warren Court jurisprudence. To the left, the emergence of CLS 
represents a view of the Warren Court as part of an outmoded con-
servative status quo, and thus CLS largely rejects the rights-based 
liberalism that Douglas championed-although I suspect that many 
CLS members counted Douglas as one of their heroes when they 
were younger and would identify even today with his stands during 
the McCarthy Era. 
Douglas's choices during the McCarthy Era were fundamen-
tally different in kind from the Warren Court's dismantling of seg-
regation, rural domination of legislatures, and an antiquated 
NAACP at Conference. Whittaker's retirement and Frankfurter's stroke resulted in the case 
being reset for oral argument and coming out as it did. 
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criminal justice system. In those areas, where the modern debate 
about judicial activism began, there was a powerful constituency on 
the sidelines applauding the Court and encouraging it to do more to 
create a better society. As Martin Shapiro importantly notes, the 
Court was protecting the Democratic Party coalition and therefore 
its own supporters. 64 That was not the case when the issue was 
protecting reds and pinks in the early 1950s. Those who saw the 
necessity of protecting civil liberties were, sadly, few and far be-
tween. Had other members of the Warren Court majority been on 
the Court during the early 1950s they might have performed as 
Black and Douglas did. Or they might not have. Warren, for in-
stance, had the opportunity to show how he would vote as late as 
1954, and he voted with the majority, not Black and Douglas, in 
both Barsky and Galvan v. Press. 
What I have suggested provides some basis for a reevaluation 
of Douglas's legacy and his importance. No one can erase his cava-
lier attitude towards doctrine. But, as time passes, any given Jus-
tice's contribution to doctrine and judicial craft recedes. To use the 
most obvious example, John Marshall has been acclaimed as the 
greatest Justice of all time, and yet even first year students are able 
to rip gaping holes in the logic of his opinions. His greatness is 
entirely divorced from the reasoning of his opinions (Marbury's ab-
surd reasoning being the most blatant) and rests instead on the fact 
that he turned the Court into a major and unique institution of 
American government. 
It may be that only a "founder" is entitled to such an evalua-
tion. Moreover, unlike Douglas, Marshall enjoyed the solid support 
of the leaders of the Bar. Nevertheless, Douglas, too, was a 
"founder" albeit a different one, a "founder" of a school that holds 
that even in the worst of times judges can actually stand up and 
demand we adhere to our ideals. Douglas received little credit at 
the time from the elites of the profession, but he had a unique credi-
bility with American youth when almost no other politically promi-
nent American had any. There, indeed, his eschewing legalisms and 
resting on a blunt moral basis may have proven no small part of his 
charm. 
When in the future we evaluate Justices, more recognition 
ought to be placed on their external influences, for those tend to be 
the more lasting. We cannot freeze the law or any given perception 
of it. It may well be that a new concept of the function of courts 
64. Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger in THE NEW AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM (A. King ed. 1978); Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commen-
tators and the Search for Values in THE BURGER COURT (V. Blasi ed. 1983). 
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will form and replace the liberal consensus that finds individual lib-
erties worthy of judicial protection in the worst of times no less than 
in the best of times. Attitudes, like reputations, are not static. But 
for over a quarter of a century, thanks in no small part to the coura-
geous stands of Black and Douglas, an ideology of judicial protec-
tion of individual liberties has dominated our legal culture as 
thoroughly as the Harvard ideology dominated the previous era. 
Each generation must decide how it wishes to choose, and Douglas 
would have been the last to suggest the dead should govern the liv-
ing. Yet by one precept, being right on the major issue of his times 
when so many others were wrong, he may have assisted future gen-
erations in choosing wisely. 
